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Introduction
This paper is a synthesis of the empirical work analyzing the trade (e.g. trade
volume) and economic (e.g. welfare) effects of food-safety regulations. Several
papers provide a descriptive discussion of the general issues of food-safety and
international trade (e.g. Henson et al. (Henson et al. 2000), Hooker and Caswell
(Hooker and Caswell 1999), IATRC (Agriculture in the WTO: the role of product
attributes in the agricultural negotiations 2001), OECD (Food safety and quality
issues: trade considerations 1999), Roberts, Josling and Orden (Roberts, Josling and
Orden 1999), Thilmany and Barrett (Thilmany and Barrett 1997)). While these studies
provide interesting frameworks and conceptualizations of the trade and economic
effects of food-safety regulations, the papers fail to provide quantitative evidence of
the effects of regulations.
This paper is a review of the few empirical papers on the food-safety regulations.
The emphasis of the empirical literature is to begin toestablish a benchmark of the
effects of the food-safety regulations. This literature review provides the results of
analyses of a limited group of food-safety regulations.
The regulations restricting trade to maintain food safety, in addition to
regulations affecting the trade of products that may carry pests or disease that harm
plant or animal life and health (and loosely, the environment), fall under the rubric of
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS
Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In the broadest sense, food-
safety regulations affecting international trade are non-tariff barriers (NTB). OECD
(Measurement of sanitary, phytosanitary and technical barriers to trade 2001) drew
attention to NTB and suggested four reasons for empirical research on NTB:
− Domestic regulations may constitute major trade impediments and their use is
proliferating. However, these NTBs may simply become more visible because of
international scrutiny or more trade-restrictive because of the decrease in tariffs.
− Quantification of the economic effects of SPS and technical regulations is an
important step in the regulatory reform process (Regulatory reform in the agri-
food sector 1997). Quantitative analyses help inform governments as to the cost
of their SPS policies and provide the elements for defining more efficient
regulations (Antle 1995).
− More satisfactory techniques for estimating the damage caused to a country by
foreign regulations may help to solve disputes and may serve as a basis for
calculating compensation claims.
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− Sectoral studies suggest that technical regulations in developed countries
constitute a considerable obstacle to agricultural food and feed exports of
developing countries (Cato and Lima dos Santos 1998; Otsuki, Wilson and
Sewadeh 2001a).
Despite the relevance of understanding the trade and economic effects, the
literature on the trade and economic effects of SPS regulations, particularly food-
safety regulations, is small. Thilmany and Barrett (Thilmany and Barrett 1997) stated,
“Currently, little is understood about how regulatory barriers affect trade and
investment volumes, nor how they affect the economic welfare of various global
consumer populations.” Since the mid-1990s, researchers have generated additional
studies of the trade and economic effects of regulations of the SPS Agreement. At
most this literature just begins to establish a benchmark of the effects.
Study 1
Otsuki, T. J, S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 2001b). “What
Price Precaution? European Harmonisation of Aflatoxin Regulations and African
Groundnut Exports”
What was the question?
The authors questioned the trade effects on nine African countries (Chad, Egypt,
The Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) of a
proposed, more stringent food-safety regulation in the EU (14 EU Member States
except Greece). The proposed regulations would harmonize all Member States of the
EU to a regulation of 2 ppb for aflatoxin B1, a carcinogen found in groundnuts. The
proposed change in regulation would have been more stringent for all but four of the
Member States.
What was the method employed?
The authors used the gravity model to estimate bilateral trade flows and the effect
of regulations on these flows. The model “specifies that a flow from origin [j] to
destination [i] can be explained by economic forces at the flow’s origin, economic
forces at the flow’s destination, and economic forces either aiding or resisting the
flow’s movement from origin to destination” (Bergstrand 1985). A simplified
specification of the model as presented in Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh (Otsuki,
Wilson and Sewadeh 2001b) isi:
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Mijkt was the trade flow in the amount of product k to EU Member State i from
African country j in year tii. The products were edible groundnuts, oil, and oilseed.
The b parameters were the coefficients to be estimated, while the error term εijkt was
assumed to have a zero mean and to be normally and independently distributed.
GNPPCit and GNPPCjt were the real per capita gross national products (GNP) in EU
Member Country i and African country j in year t adjusted to the 1995 US dollar.
DIST was the geographical distance between countries i and j. STikt was the maximum
aflatoxin (Aflatoxin B1) level imposed on groundnut products by country i for
product k for year t (since data were only available for 1995, the authors used that
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level for all years, assuming no change in maximum levels). RAINjt was the average
rainfall in African country j. The authors included the average rainfall because
moisture levels positively influence aflatoxin levels during storage. COLij was a
dummy variable for a colonial tie between countries i and j. YEAR was a linear time
trend (with 1989=1 to 1998=10) to account for technological change.
The regression was a pooled regression with dummy variables for oilseeds and
oil interacted with the coefficients of per capita GNP, rainfall, regulations and the
intercept. The model also had a fixed effects structure where the groups were defined
by the exporting country.
What were the results and implications?
The results showed that the per capita GNP of the EU countries had a positive
and significant effect on exports for all products. The variable representing colonial
ties was significant and positive. The variable representing the regulation was
significant and positive for edible groundnuts and oil. The authors also estimated the
model as unpooled five-year, rolling-average blocks, which generated elasticities of
increasing value, suggesting that the regulation became more substantial over time.
Using the estimated elasticities (covering the entire period) of the regulations and the
trade volume and prices of 1998, the authors showed that making the regulation more
stringent at 1 ppb, the estimated loss of value for African exports would be 482,400
US$ or 72 percent of the 1998 value. If the EU countries adjusted their regulations to
the proposed EU regulation of 2 ppb, then the loss to African exports would be
238,900 US$ or 36 percent of the 1998 value. If all of the Member States of the EU
adjusted their regulations to 9 ppb, the international standard that Codex
Alimentariusiii suggested, the increase in trade value would be 480,600 US$ or 72
percent of the 1998 value.
Study 2
Otsuki, T., J. S. Wilson, and M. Sewadeh (Otsuki, Wilson and Sewadeh 2001a),
“Saving Two in a Billion: Quantifying the Trade Effect of European Food Safety
Standards on African Exports.”
What was the question?
Otuski, Wilson, and Sewadeh investigated the effect on the value of trade flows
of a proposed, harmonized regulation on maximum allowable aflatoxin levels for two
food product groups: i) cereals and cereal preparations and ii) dried fruits, nuts, and
vegetables. Specifically the authors made comparisons among the status-quo
regulation; the proposed EU regulation, which would harmonize the Member States
and was more stringent than the status quo for most Member States; and the suggested
Codex regulation, which was less stringent for most Member States. The results of the
changes in the regulation were linked to the differences of estimated health outcomes
in terms of number of liver cancer deaths resulting from the different maximum
aflatoxin levels. The countries included in the model were 15 European countries
(Norway and the Member States of the EU except Greece) and nine African countries
(Chad, Egypt, the Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe).
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What was the method employed?
The authors used a similar gravity model as presented in paper 1 to look at the
effect of aflatoxin regulations on the value of trade flows for two food product groups.
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The variables in this model were described in the methods section of paper 1, except
for the dependent variable. The dependent variable Vijkt was the value, not the volume,
of trade of product k imported by country i and exported country j in year t.
The authors stated “Dummy variables for exporting countries are included in the
model in order to control unobserved factors such as environment and product
quantity, which may vary across these countries” (p. 505). Therefore, additional
dummy variables were included in the model. The specification for the gravity model
also included a fixed-effect specification for the importing countries.
What were the results and implications?
The models were estimated for i) cereals and cereal preparations, and ii) dried
fruits, nuts, and vegetables, separately. For the cereal and cereal-preparation model,
the per capita GNP of European countries, the regulation and the colonial-tie dummy
variables were positive and significant at the five-percent level. The distance variable
was negative and significant at the five-percent level. For the dried fruits, nuts and
vegetable model, per capita GNP for European countries, the aflatoxin regulation, and
the colonial tie were all positive and significant at the five-percent level. The per
capita GNP for the African countries variable was also positive but significant at the
ten-percent level. For the dried fruits, nuts and vegetable model, the distance variable
was negative and significant at the five-percent level.
These coefficients showed that an increase in the per capita GNP would increase
the import of the products. The positive sign on the regulation suggested that
increased stringency of the regulation, that is lowering the maximum allowable level
of aflatoxin B1, would lower the trade of the products. The colonial tie had a positive
effect on the trade of goods between countries. The negative sign on the distance
suggested that countries that were more distant trading partners traded less than
trading partners closer together.
The authors separated the data into three groups: i) coconuts, Brazil and cashew
nuts; ii) groundnuts and other edible nuts; and iii) dried and preserved fruit. Two of
the estimated elasticities for the regulation (because of the double-log specification,
the elasticity is the estimated coefficient from the regulation variable) were positive
and statistically significant at five-percent significance level - (groundnuts and other
edible nuts; and dried and preserved fruit) and at the ten-percent level (coconuts,
Brazil and cashew nuts). The elasticity of the regulation for dried and preserved fruit
was not significant. The elasticity of the regulation on the trade of groundnuts and
other edible nuts was larger than the elasticity for Brazil and cashew nuts. Given that
most of the concern for aflatoxins has to do with groundnuts, the result was not
surprising.
Given the estimated elasticities the authors calculated the impact of harmonizing
the various EU regulations to the proposed, more stringent policy or to the less
stringent Codex standard. In 1998 the value of cereal and cereal-product exports from
Africa to Europe was 298 million US$. A move to the more stringent proposed EU
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regulation would generate a loss of 177 million US$ or 59 percent of the 1998 value.
A move to the less stringent Codex standard would generate a gain in trade value of
202 million US$ or 68 percent of the 1998 value. The reduction in value of using the
proposed EU harmonized regulation rather than the Codex standard would be 76
percent of the 1998 value.
The results were similar for the value of edible nuts. In 1998 the value of edible
nuts from Africa to Europe was 472 million US$. A move to the more stringent,
proposed EU regulation would generate a loss of 220 million US$ or 47 percent of the
1998 value. A move to the less stringent Codex standard would generate a gain in
trade value of 66 million US$ or 14 percent of the 1998 value. The reduction in value
when using the EU harmonized regulation rather than the Codex standard would be
53 percent of the 1998 value.
According to the estimated results and estimates from the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO), the number of lives saved from liver cancer from the more
stringent aflatoxin regulations would be 0.9 lives saved per one billion persons. The
loss in value of African food exports to the EU of moving to the more stringent,
proposed EU aflatoxin regulation would be 340 million US$. Comparing the EU
regulation with the Codex standard, the loss in value of African food exports would
be 670 million US$ and the gain would be 2.3 lives saved per one billion persons.
Study 3
Wilson, J. S. and T. Otsuki (Wilson and Otsuki 2001), “Global Trade and Food
Safety: Winners and Losers in a Fragmented System.”
What was the question?
The question that Wilson and Otsuki attempted to answer was: what would be the
effect of harmonizing of aflatoxin regulations on trade for cereal, edible nuts, and
dried fruit on trade of these products? The authors also investigated the effects on the
different importers and exporters.
What was the method employed?
The authors used a modification of the gravity model as given in papers 1 and 2
to look at the trade between 15 importing (4 developing) countries and 31 exporting
(21 developing) countries.
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The descriptions of most terms in the model are given in the methods section of
paper 1. EUij, ASEANij (Association of South East Asian Nations), NAFTAij (North
American Free Trade Agreement), and MERCOSURij (Southern Common Market)
were dummy variables, which are equal to one if the exporting and importing
countries were members of the trade union and equal to zero otherwise. The variables
YEAR96, YEAR97, and YEAR98 were dummy variables representing the different
years in the study. The authors limited the data set to the years 1995 to 1998, which
was a shorter timeframe relative to the timeframe of the other two papers.
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What were the results and implications?
The model was used for i) cereals, ii) edible nuts, and iii) dried and preserved
fruit, separately. For the cereals model, the coefficients of per capita GNP of the
importer, the regulation, the dummy variables for colonial ties, EU membership, and
MERCOSUR membership were positive and significant at the one-percent
significance level. The coefficient of the per capita GNP of the exporting country was
also positive but significant at the five-percent level. The coefficients of the distance
variable and the dummy variable for membership in NAFTA were negative and
significant at the one-percent level.
For the edible nuts model, the coefficients of the variables per capita GNP for
importing nations, the regulation, and the dummy variables for colonial ties and EU
membership were all positive and significant at the one-percent level. The coefficient
of the distance variable was negative and significant at the one-percent level.
For the dried and preserved fruits model, the coefficients of per capita GNP of the
importer and exporter, the dummy variables for colonial ties, EU membership, and
MERCOSUR membership were positive and significant at the one-percent level. The
coefficient for the dummy variable of membership in ASEAN and NAFTA were
positive and significant at the five- and ten-percent levels, respectively. The
coefficients of the distance variable and the time dummy for 1998 were negative and
significant at the one- and ten-percent levels, respectively. However, the coefficient
for the regulation was not statistically significant; thus, further analysis of the variable
was omitted.
The authors provided scenarios in which they compared different settings of the
aflatoxin regulation. Under the base scenario all importers had different aflatoxin
regulations. Of the 15 importers only four had a regulation that was less stringent than
the Codex standard. Of the six EU Member States, only two had regulations, which
were more restrictive than the proposed EU regulation. The different cases were 1) all
nations move to the proposed, more stringent EU regulation, 2) only the EU nations
move to the proposed EU regulation, and 3) all nations move to the Codex standard.
The authors found that if all importing nations would adopt the Codex standard the
trade of cereal and nuts would increase by 6.1 billion US$ or 51 percent compared to
the 1998 level. The result was 7.1 billion US$ (65 percent) more than the value in the
case where only the Member States of the EU adopt the proposed EU standard. In the
case where all importing countries adopted the proposed EU regulation, the trade
under the Codex standard would be 12.2 billion US$ (or 67 percent) more than the
1998 level.
Study 4
Overton, B. J. Begin, and W. Foster (Overton, Beghin and Foster 1995).
“Phytosanitary Regulation and Agricultural Flows: Tobacco Inputs and Cigarettes
Outputs”
What was the question?
Overton, Begin and Foster stated that at the time of publishing this paper,
Germany, Italy, and Spain restricted the level of maleic hydrazide to 80 ppm in
domestic and imported cigarettesiv. Maleic hydrazide is a growth inhibitor used in the
production of tobacco. However, the regulation restricted the presence of the chemical
in the final product, not on unprocessed tobacco. Because different levels of the
market are affected by the regulation, the authors investigated the trade and economic
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effects of the maximum residue levels on the input and output levels. In particular, the
authors simulated the effects of making more stringent EU regulation on tobacco-
growing and tobacco-manufacturing industries on production costs, factor demands,
and trade flows.
What was the method employed?
The authors used a partial equilibrium model to simulate the effect of a 10-
percent reduction in the maximum residue level of maleic hydrazide in cigarettes. The
model had supply and demand equations for US and EU cigarettes, assuming a
constant elasticity of substitution for inputs and constant returns to scale. The model
had derived demand equations for tobacco (from both the US, which contained the
residue, and the EU, which did not have the residue) and other inputs. The authors
made the level of the residue endogenous, which had to remain below the exogenous
regulated level. The level of the residue was a function of the amount of US tobacco
used and the quota lease rate US producers received, which was endogenous and a
function of the US price and marginal cost.
What were the results and implications?
The authors estimated the impact of a 10-percent reduction in the maximum
residue level under two scenarios:
− The US government maintained the pre-policy price of US tobacco by lowering
the tobacco quota, which would cause the US marginal cost to increase, and
− the US tobacco price was allowed to fall by holding the amount of quota
constant.
Under the first scenario, the authors showed that the demand for US cigarettes
would fall by 0.085 percent while the demand for EU cigarettes would increase by
0.02 percent. Because of the constant returns to scale assumption, US tobacco-leaf
exports increased compared to the EU. This result was because of the increase in EU
cigarette production, which mitigated the overall loss of US tobacco (leaf and
cigarettes) to the EU of 1.6 percent. US production would decline by 7.1 percent, and
non-US tobacco production increased by 12.9 percent. The lower production of US
tobacco would lead to a lower residue level of 2.8 percent.
In the second scenario, the quota remained fixed after the 10-percent reduction of
the maximum residue level. The demand for US cigarettes would fall by 0.013
percent under the new price of US tobacco leaf. The price of US tobacco leaf would
fall by 0.26 percent; thus, the EU and rest of the world demand for US tobacco leaf
would increase by 0.86 and 0.47 percent. Despite the increase in the demand for US
tobacco leaf, total exports of tobacco exports (leaf and in cigarettes) would decline by
1.51 percent. The increase in US tobacco leaf in EU cigarettes was the result of a
substitution away from EU tobacco, a reduction of EU tobacco by 0.059 percentv. The
residue level does not fall. This result showed that EU tobacco producers would be
hurt, if only slightly, by the more stringent, maximum residue policy.
Assessment
The trio of gravity model papers provided some evidence that a food-safety
regulation may have an impact on international trade. The results collectively provide
evidence that a less stringent regulation may increase trade flows and consequently
increase the income of foreign producers. The latter point is particularly important for
developing countries. The effect of a more stringent regulation in some countries may
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reduce trade. However, the importance of that loss is unclear because of the
mitigating effects of trade diversion. That is, while the trade to some countries is
limited by a more stringent regulation, an importer with a less stringent regulation
may purchase the diverted good. The diverted good may receive a lower price, but the
trade is not lost necessarily as the gravity models predicted.
In general, the gravity model is not linked to the supply and demand of the
product under study. The changes along or movements of the supply and/or demand
curves to generate the changes in value (or volume) of trade that occur are not clear.
Therefore, the welfare effects of the change in regulations are not known. The authors
stated that they could not estimate the welfare effects of the different regulations with
the gravity model. Nevertheless, estimating the welfare effects of changing
regulations is important for understanding the differential effects of the regulations on
different economic actors. Therefore, more work investigating the welfare effects of
regulations is an important study area.
The four papers here and most of the other literature of NTB began with the
hypothesis that the SPS regulations restrict trade. Overton, Beghin, and Foster
(Overton, Beghin and Foster 1995) showed the surprising result that domestic
producers might even be hurt by the regulation. Yet, the literature failed to explore the
possibility that these regulations might improve trade. The trade-enhancing features of
these regulations occur when measures reflect a movement toward greater
harmonization or improved transparency. Disentangling the trade-enhancing effects of
food-safety regulations, and more generally SPS regulations, from other factors that
may enhance trade is difficult. Therefore, a useful area of research would be to look at
whether harmonization and transparency can actually improve trade and welfare.
Another consideration for future research is an expansion of the geographic reach
of the research. Studies that look at the effects of regulations from Northern countries
on Southern countries would be beneficial. As seen in the SPS Committee, more and
more regulations are being developed in Southern countries that are having an effect
on other Southern countries.
Conclusion
Only a limited amount of research on the trade and economic effects of food-safety
regulations exists. Further work needs to be done in this area. However, further
research is hampered by the limited ability to generalize the various types of
regulations. Another difficulty with research in this area is how to incorporate
information from risk assessments into economic models appropriately. Such efforts
require collaboration of food-safety scientists, regulators, and economists. This work
will be beneficial in helping policymakers to develop food-safety policies that provide
a nationally acceptable level of food safety with the least trade distorting policies.
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